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Abstract:  
Critical anthropological theory needs to be a theory of relationality. Only through a 
relational theory can we come to a perception of our fundamental commonality and 
conceptualise difference as being given significance by the unequal relations that we stand 
in towards each other. A relational theory needs concepts that reflect on the asymmetrical 
interdependence that shape the dynamics of power relations, which give rise to institutions 
of ‘significant difference’. I propose Luc Boltanski’s notion of “situation” as a concept that 
enables us to grasp the structured contingency that shapes our mutual interdependence. 
Situation, by making possible the micro-analysis of macro-relations, also provides the 
conceptual tools to think beyond that which is, towards that which is possible. 
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“Critical thought is that which gives us the means to think the world as it is and as it 
could be,” (Wacqant 2004, 1). 
 
I have recently engaged in debates about what some call the transfer of law: processes of 
the circulation of legal norms (e.g. Eckert et al 2012). In the debates about the travels of 
legal norms, I have often found myself in interdisciplinary conversations. The central 
expectation from the expertise of anthropologists in these conversations was that we 
explain the Other. At times when more and more disciplines adopt some notion of 
“Ethnography”, the ostensible idea of what social anthropology can contribute is expertise 
on “the other”. This ranges from crude questions such as “how do these others, who are so 
different, function, so that we can write them a suitable constitution”, to refined and 
theoretically informed caution about the possibility of understanding and communicating. 
The former express worries about the fate of norms, which might be deformed, abused or 
undermined when they travel to places shaped by different social relations; the latter 
express worries about the fate of those subjected to these foreign norms. The first assume 
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that each norm has an original template; the latter often assume a form of authenticity that 
presumes the normative homogeneity and integration of those perceived as different. Yet, 
neither of these positions addresses what social and political processes actually lead to the 
dominance of a norm, and the consequent processual structuring and regulation of social 
relations. Instead both focus on projections of foreignness between norms and norm 
addressees.  
“Awe of alterity”, inherent in these perspectives as problematisation or idealisation of 
difference, leads to us see only difference in the other, and negates all that we share, which 
shapes our everyday human experience (Das 2012, 328; Glick Schiller 2012; 2015), our 
fundamental commonality. Such awe of alterity, whether with positive or negative 
connotations, establishes all-encompassing differences, and stands in the way of addressing 
the constitution of alterity in social and political relations. It deflects from the analysis of the 
structural effects that give relevance to difference. Since such awe thus leads to the denial of 
what Nina Glick Schiller has called the “domains of commonality” (e.g. 2015) and, 
consequently, de-socialises and essentialises difference, I see it as one of the foremost tasks 
of anthropological theory to theorise the sociality of difference. By the sociality of difference 
I mean the societal production of institutions that a) produce specific forms of difference, 
and b) that give relevance to such difference.1 Theorizing the sociality of difference, we can 
get hold of the ghosts that we called upon us (Goethe 1827, 218) when we struggled for the 
recognition of other social formations as valuable in their own right. Obviously, this latter 
endeavour has not been accomplished yet, and can only be accomplished in conjuncture 
with theorizing the sociality of difference, since any essentialising notion of difference easily 
lends itself to justifications of inequity. We thus have three intricately related tasks before 
us, namely, exploring our commonality, struggling for the equitable recognition of multiple 
ways of being, and addressing the processes and conditions for the societal production of 
difference. We have to accomplish these tasks in a way that their interdependence is 
understood, because none can be accomplished without the others. I recognize that this is at 
the heart of many anthropologists` work, and it is not necessarily their fault that one-sided 
or simplified understandings have been adopted. It is, however, our responsibility to 
                                                        
1 I differ in the use of the term „sociality“ from that of Glick-Schiller et al. 2011, who hold „sociality“ to 
summarize all social relations from conflict to unity. They use the term „sociability“ to denote the ontological 
fact of having some domains of sameness (Glick-Schiller et al. 2011). I use sociality in the sense of 
„Vergesellschaftung“, intending to stress the systemic societal factors that create difference, rather than simply 
the social processes as such.  
continue to show how the three tasks are constitutive of an understanding of the human 
condition: On the one hand we share a common human experience that is at the base of our 
capacity to comprehend each other and we need concepts, methodology and theory that 
reflects upon this sameness. On the other hand, our different ways of perceiving and 
conceptualizing the world are inflected by the relations of inequality in which we stand 
towards each other. These premises, and, I would argue: only these premises make possible 
a critical anthropological theory, a theory of relationality that addresses domination for its 
specific constitution of difference.  
Such a critical anthropological theory thus needs to rest on the assertion of our insights into 
the basic commensurability of human experience. Positing such a basic commensurability 
means to say that we are the same in some respect, even if different in others. It denies 
complete difference, which would produce incommensurability. Claims to 
incommensurability, I would assert, are political projects no matter who engages in them, 
and whether they serve to ward off dominating others (Humphrey 2012) or, more often, as a 
means of domination. So in the end, my claim of a basic commensurability is a political 
project, but one that, I think, is better substantiated by our empirical findings, and simply by 
our evidence that we can comprehend and understand each other. Politically, 
commensurability is the turn from difference to inequality: only when we consider ourselves 
comparable and thus equal to others, can differences be termed inequalities, and only if 
there is commensurability can such inequalities be unjust. This means that, just as much as 
power relations are constitutive of inequality, so they are constitutive of difference and 
difference cannot be fully understood outside them. 
 
The potential for commensurability that lies in our fundamental commonality, and thus the 
sociality and relationality of difference, has struck me whenever I have examined globally 
circulating legal norms. Unlike the most ready explanation, which foregrounded cultural 
difference in my interdisciplinary conversation, not only the validity of a norm within a 
specific situation, but above all its meaning –– that is: that specific interpretation of a norm 
that held sway in a particular situation –– appeared to depend to a large degree on 
situational constellations within larger figurations. These determined the respective 
dominance, hegemony or recognition of different normative orders, and the effects of their 
plurality on social relations.  Thus, an empirical exploration of the constitution of the relative 
power of different normative interpretations was best captured with Elias’s concept of the 
‘figuration’ (1978), which describes the far reaching webs of asymmetric interdependencies 
that are embedded in wider, and more long-standing socio-economic transformations. The 
concept of ‚Figurations’ thus puts the focus on the dynamics of transformation of (unequal) 
power relations. Insights into the relationality of difference led me to seek a conceptual 
position that would enable the diachronic and synchronic analysis of interdependence, 
through which social phenomena could be examined in their constituent dynamic 
entanglements. The “structured contingency” that inheres in the concept of figuration is 
captured by the concept of ‘situation’ that Luc Boltanski has advanced. Boltanski used the 
notion of situation to overcome the determinism of Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus 
(Boltanski 2010, 41). I think we can extend his attention to situations and their structured 
contingency further in order to overcome the pitfalls of both methodological individualism 
and structural determinism (see Boltanski 2014). If we take Boltanski`s notion of situation 
seriously, it is about micro-analyses of the contingent encounter of different logics of action 
in situations structured by historical figurations. Thus, it opens up the possibility of the 
micro-analysis of macro-relations and of those processes that establish and transform 
historical figurations. It offers “conceptual frameworks (…) that could put into play causal 
relations grasped on different scales at the same time” (Boltanski 2014, 266).  
Thereby, the concept of situation also opens up the potential to think about possible 
alternatives: Since situations are analysed in the fine-grained diachronic and synchronic 
interdependencies that constitute them, what was not possible and why not are questions 
that can be addressed. This concept of situation allows us to provide theories and concepts 
of current social relations, to theorize and historicise the entanglement of processes, that is, 
to grapple with structured contingency, which constitutes such situations. Thus, what Anna 
Tsing calls `Friction`, the contingent encounter of different, far-reaching processes of 
circulation,  can be examined. However, the utility of the concept is not confined to “global” 
processes connoted as part of “globalisation” as the reference to Tsing might suggest. It is 
certainly not the point to establish some juncture between a local and autonomous past and 
a present affected by global interdependencies. Rather, we need to re-emphasize a 
perspective on the present that is inherent in the anthropological project, namely, to attend 
to the historical and social constitution of any phenomena.  
Nor is the intention to trace potentially endless chains of interdependence, the distributed 
agency in which any process, event or phenomena is connected. Rather, the question to ask 
is how far such chains of interdependence and entanglement reach, and what particular role 
specific institutions, such as law, play in cutting these chains of interdependency at very 
specific points, as Marilyn Strathern (2001) has shown in her analysis of intellectual property 
rights. Thus, by analysing institutions that determine which chains of interdependence are 
deemed relevant, and which are given institutional significance, we can analyse the 
structuration of figurations. Thereby we can also address processes and institutions that 
decouple chains of interdependencies. Decoupling can be the result of both autonomy and 
isolation, that is: the possibility of decoupling can be based on positions of domination, 
which make possible processes of monopolisation and lead to appearances of in-
dependence, although they are made possible by a specific position within interdependent 
relations. On the other hand, decoupling can be based on positions of subordination in 
which specific interdependencies are devalued to the degree of being negated; that is 
exclusion.2 Situations of decoupling with such diverse grounds will thus have equally diverse 
effects on inclusion into or exclusion from wider social relations. To address decoupling as 
decoupling, that is, as a relational process, rather than as given autonomy – a quality that 
inheres in an entity, enables us to examine the conditions of its possibility, and thus to 
analyse the constitution of situations that appear as given. 
Thus, such institutional “cuts” in the network (Strathern 2001), i.e. chains of 
interdependencies, are political cuts in as much as they recognize and determine the reach 
of interdependence and entanglement. They are political in as much as they structure the 
way we can legitimately make claims on each other (Eckert 2016); they shape the 
possibilities of what connections can be thought, and which remain imperceptible (Boltanski 
2010; see also Lukes 1974, part III).  
 
To provide analytical tools to address the relationalities that shape our world, and to reveal 
how relationalities are obscured through the presumption of given (racialised, cultural, 
gendered, or religious) differences, is to engage in critique. Any social science has at its core 
a critique of what we find the world to be. Critique means exercising the faculty of 
                                                        
2 ‘Self-exclusion’, too, since its terms can most often not be self-determined, is thus 
constituted from a subordinated position within interdependent relations. 
observation, which is always in some sense the construction of judgement, if only in the way 
of selecting and ordering the relevance of criteria of observation. Several decades of debate 
about the anthropological project centre on the need to acknowledge that critique is 
inherent in every part of the anthropological endeavour.  Hence anthropological theory 
requires making explicit the concepts, questions and criteria of critique.  
Critique does not necessarily mean criticism, but criticism needs to rest on critique. One way 
to criticise is to ask: “who’s done it?” a bit like Agatha Christie. It seems to me we can reach 
a more thorough critique if we replace the question “who’s done it?” with the question 
“how could this have happened (even if all those involved might have intended something 
else)”,3 the question that is implied if we approach phenomena, state of affairs through the 
concept of situation (see also Glick Schiller 2012).  
Why ask “how could this happen?” What do we gain from such a perspective? With the 
question “how could this happen” we gain analytical independence from assuming 
intentions. “Sociology is not a detective story, still less a spy story, even if it sometimes tries 
to solve mysteries and even if it finds itself confronting the question of conspiracy”, writes 
Boltanski (2014, 260). Intentions may play a role, but we must ask how intentions actually 
come to bear on processes. We gain independence from ascribing some agency to a potent 
“world spirit” (Hegel’s Weltgeist), be this “neo-liberalism” or any other dogma, yet see how 
such a ‘spirit of the age’ can be located within the practices of asymmetrically interrelated 
actors with unequal power taking multitudinous actions. Ideologies, Hegel’s “the spirit[s] of 
the age”, and governmentalities gain potency by legitimating specific orientations of actors 
actions and practices, by constituting alliances between differently positioned actors; by 
offering a common language that brings disparate projects into one fold, and thereby giving 
voice to some and silencing others. Through them we shape our thought and orientations. 
Just like intentions, fashions of legitimation and justification can have potency: they explain 
projects, such as humanitarianism (Fassin 2010) or the rights discourse (Merry 2003), and 
thereby orient those involved. How exactly they gain such potency can better be elucidated 
through the question “how did this happen”: then we can examine how intentions, 
ideologies, fashions, diverse logics of action and diverse logics of practice interlock to 
                                                        
3 According to Hegel, the question “How did this happen”, is the question of tragedy: tragedy deals with the 
collision not between good and evil, but between one-sided positions, which all might contain good and evil. 
Tragedy is about the dilemmas of entangled but possibly contradictory actions, which follow their own specific 
logics, aims and valences, and that produce in their sum something other than any of them might have 
intended. 
produce results that are neither necessarily intended nor determined, but produced in 
figurations.  
In some way this perspective bears resemblance to the new holisms that have been 
advocated for by various anthropologists, like Xiang (in this issue) or Tatjana Thelen and 
Erdmute Alber (forthcoming, 22f).  This is, of course, not the holism of structural 
functionalism, but a holism of historical processes. This new holism, to me, means asking 
what different forces act upon us, what material conditions and what legal and political 
institutions shape our existence, how these different forces and projects work together to 
shape what we think we are and what we want, and how these forces by us realising them 
are transformed. While expertise on “the other” is, as I hinted at in the beginning, what is 
often expected from us anthropologists by others, holism is possibly the unique feature that 
distinguishes us more than anything else from other social sciences, among them all versions 
of differentiation theory. Not that we need to assume this difference to be absolute, since 
differentiation theory is also interested in the context of systems, and we, too, are 
interested in the auto-poetic momentum of sub-fields – or maybe we aren’t? Is our question 
not more about the conditions of the possibility of such momentum? Is it thus not more 
about the constitution of decoupling, autonomy or isolation? Is it thus not the attention to 
the structured entanglements of different momentums that makes us take distance to all 
teleological or other hierarchisations of different forms of social order  - hierarchisations 
that are at least implicit in most differentiation theories in as much as they imply an increase 
in differentiation as a quasi-natural path, and de-differentiation as a sign of decline? Is not 
the abstention from privileging any one form of social organisation founded in exactly such a 
holistic perspective, which examines all forms of social order and organisation for their 
constitution through the coincidence of divergent actions oriented towards diverse projects, 
and in asymmetrical interdependence, that bring forth structured relations? 
 
How can we critique and criticise then? Is not examination of structured contingency and 
concurrence of diverse logics of action merely descriptive in its result – a verlaufsgeschichte 
without reflection on the selection of criteria of observation? I consider a perspective that 
integrates the diachronic and synchronic constitution of situations in far reaching 
interdependencies of specific figurations a potent form of critique and of criticism. By 
overcoming the inevitability of structural determinism, and the voluntarism of 
methodological individualism, but examining how diverse projects are shaped and shape 
themselves the world they act upon, it makes possible not only tracing why things are as 
they are, but also how they could have been different at any point. And more: it provides 
the possibility to think how they could be different in the future. “Knowledge of the social 
determinants of thought (and difference; JE) is indispensable to liberating thought, if only 
slightly, from the determinisms that weigh on it (as on all social practice) and thus to putting 
us in a position to project ourselves mentally outside of the world as it is given to us in order 
to invent, concretely, futures other than the one inscribed in the order of things.” (Waqcant 
2004, 1) This means that theory has the capacity to elucidate and articulate the possible, the 
alternative that remained silenced and unsayable (see Xiang this issue). Critical theory must 
assume this task. It is critical in as much as it can trace processes of silencing and make 
possible imagining what is not – as yet - but could be possible (Butler 2004).  
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